Any defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence
based on the credibility of the State’s lone eye-witness has an uphill
battle. Nevertheless, in some cases there
exists the possibility that the accusations were based on having had a
dream. There is precedent in Indiana for paying
closer attention to such a case.
When
reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. McHenry
v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind.
2005). Moreover, we
respect the jury's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence. Id. And the jury is free to believe or disbelieve
witnesses as it sees fit. McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996). We will affirm if the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom could have allowed a
reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. Finally,
the uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind. 2001); Mishler v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1095,
1102-1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Indiana recognizes an exception in determining the
sufficiency of evidence on appeal known as the Incredible Dubiosity (or the Inherently
Improbable) rule where the reviewing court does evaluate the credibility of
witness testimony. Winn v. State, 748
N.E.2d 352, 361 (Ind.
2001).[1] “In essence, when faced with a claim of
inherently improbable or incredibly dubious testimony, the court on review will
reverse only when no reasonable person could believe it.” Shippen
v. State, 477 N.E.2d 903, 904 (Ind.
1985).
In Mishler v. State, supra, the defendant
maintained that his convictions must be set aside because the victim’s testimony
was equivocal and contradictory and no forensic evidence was offered to prove that
she was a victim of abuse. She said the
events may have been a dream. Although
the State acknowledged that B.P. testified at trial that she did not know
whether she dreamed about the incidents, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence
demonstrated that B.P. was initially certain of what had occurred when she gave
her original statement. And it was not
until her mother asked her if it was a dream that there was a doubt in B.P.'s
mind. Mishler at 1103.
The
Court noted that after her mother made this suggestion, B.P.'s grandmother
observed that B.P. became withdrawn and noted that this reaction was typical
when B.P. was scolded and humiliated. As
a result, B.P. reported the next day that she thought that she had dreamed the abuse.
However, the record also demonstrated
that immediately after B.P. made that statement, she telephoned her mother,
raised her voice, and angrily said, "I know what happened." B.P.’s mother also acknowledged that she had
suggested to B.P. that Mishler's alleged actions may only have been a dream,
and she admitted that she did not believe B.P.'s accusations. B.P. testified that her mother talked to her
on multiple occasions prior to trial about the possibility that the abuse was a
dream. Mishler at 1103.
In
light of these circumstances, the Court of Appeals found that a jury could
properly infer that B.P.'s initial accounts of the incidents and her
recollections at trial were accurate, and it was her mother who placed doubt in
B.P.'s mind about what had actually occurred. Mishler
at 1103.
The
question in future cases based on dream testimony is whether those indicia of
reliability are presented at trial. Who
planted this idea in alleged victim’s mind?
Was the seed of doubt already there?
What were the circumstances that might lead the witness to fabricate? Does the witness’s background indicate the
ability and motivation to fabricate a story?
With the right facts, a defendant might have a legitimate challenge to
their conviction on appeal.
- Jamie
Edgar
[1] See also Case v. State, 458 N.E.2d 223,
226 (Ind. 1984); Loyd v.
State, 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (Ind. 1980), 272 Ind. 404, 407, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881, 101 S. Ct. 231, 66 L. Ed. 2d 105; Davis
v. State, 658 N.E.2d 896, 897 (Ind. 1995) (“[A]n appellate tribunal may impinge upon the
jury's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Prior decisions have employed various
linguistic formulations to describe when this may occur.”); Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223
(Ind. 1994) ("coerced, equivocal, wholly
uncorroborated testimony of 'incredible dubiosity"'); Walters v. State, 495 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind. 1986) ("inherently unbelievable"); Gaddis v. State, 251 N.E.2d 658, 662
(Ind. 1969), 253 Ind. 73, 81 ("uncredible [sic] dubiosity"); Penn v. State, 146 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Ind.
1957), 237 Ind. 374, 379 ("inherently improbable" testimony).
